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ABSTRACT. This article argues that claims to recover trust property from
third parties arise in response to a trustee’s duty to preserve identiﬁable
property, and that unjust enrichment is incompatible with such claims.
First, unjust enrichment can only assist with the recovery of abstract wealth
and so it does not assist in the recovery of speciﬁc property. Second, it is
diﬃcult to identify a convincing justiﬁcation for introducing unjust enrich-
ment. Third, it will work to the detriment of innocent recipients. The article
goes on to show how Re Diplock supports this analysis, by demonstrating
that no duty of preservation had been breached and that a proprietary
claim should not have been available in that case. The simple conclusion
is that claims to recover speciﬁc property and claims for unjust enrichment
should be seen as mutually exclusive.
KEYWORDS: trusts, third parties, proprietary claims, knowing receipt, res-
titution, unjust enrichment, Re Diplock.
I. INTRODUCTION
According to orthodox trust principles, where property is transferred in
breach of trust, a beneﬁciary can either bring a proprietary claim to recover
the property or a personal claim against a knowing recipient of the trust
property (hereinafter, the combination of these two claims will be referred
to as the “equitable regime”). However, it has been suggested in a number
of recent authorities that beneﬁciaries should also be able to bring a strict
liability personal claim for unjust enrichment against third-party recipients
of trust property.1 The availability of a strict liability personal claimwill be of
central importance where an innocent recipient has dissipated trust property
but where they are still enriched. This issue also has further implications
* I would like to thank Dr Astrid Sanders for reading numerous versions of this article, as well as the two
anonymous reviewers. Address for Correspondence: Aston Law, Aston Business School, University of
Aston, Birmingham, B4 7ET, UK. Email: d.salmons@aston.ac.uk.
1 Relfo v Varsani [2014] EWCA Civ 360, at [1], per Arden L.J.; Barclays Bank Plc v Kalamohan [2010]
EWHC 1383, at [74], per Proudman J.; AAH Pharmaceuticals Ltd. v Birdi [2011] EWHC 1625 (QB), at
[29], [38], per Coulson J.; MGN Ltd. v Teresa Horton [2009] EWHC 1680 (QB); [2009] All E.R. 99
(Eng), at [4], [36], per Tugendhat J.; Zumax Nigeria Ltd. v First City Monument Bank Plc [2016]
EWCA Civ 567, at [78]–[80], per Kitchin L.J.
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such as determining who should bear the burden of proving the recipient’s
fault and also the possible introduction of the change of position defence
where the recipient retains traceable proceeds of trust property.
The position in this article is that strict liability personal claims are
inappropriate where the beneﬁciary has a right to recover speciﬁc property.
Existing accounts have sought to reject the introduction of unjust enrich-
ment on the basis of the recipient’s security of receipt or on the claimant’s
pre-existing equitable title. This article explains that neither of those expla-
nations provide a clear enough reason for rejecting unjust enrichment.
Instead, the original contribution of this article is the argument that the
underlying principle of the equitable regime is to enable the recovery of
property transferred in breach of the trustee’s duty to preserve the beneﬁ-
ciary’s interests in identiﬁable property (the “duty of preservation”). This
is important for four reasons. First, a claim for unjust enrichment does
not provide an appropriate response to the breach of the trustee’s duty of
preservation as it only enables the recovery of value as opposed to speciﬁc
property. Second, attempts to identify a reason why the recipient’s enrich-
ment is unjust would unsettle well established principles in equity.
Moreover, the primary justiﬁcations for the introduction of unjust enrich-
ment are to avoid the uncertainty created by the fault requirement in know-
ing receipt and to enable a claim to be made against an unknowing recipient
who has innocently dissipated trust property. However, fault will still be of
central importance in claims for unjust enrichment in determining the avail-
ability of the change of position defence. Furthermore, any “injustice” cre-
ated by the dissipation of trust property by an innocent recipient is already
resolved through the personal liability of the trustee, not through the per-
sonal liability of the recipient. Third, in light of the lack of any need for
unjust enrichment, it is further demonstrated that its introduction would
impose an unnecessary burden on innocent recipients.2 It has been sug-
gested that this consequence could possibly be mitigated by the introduc-
tion of the defence of change of position for proprietary claims to
traceable proceeds.3 However, this would only serve to weaken the beneﬁ-
ciary’s ability to recover speciﬁc property, undermining the wider scheme
of enabling the recovery of trust property. The fourth reason is that the
understanding of the equitable regime presented in this article provides
the basis for a reappraisal of the Court of Appeal’s decision in Re
Diplock.4 It is demonstrated in the penultimate section of this article that
an executor does not generally owe a duty of preservation to legatees
and that no proprietary claim should have been available in that case.
The absence of a general duty of preservation explains the development
2 See text following note 141 below.
3 See text at note 158 below.
4 Re Diplock [1948] Ch. 465 (CA).
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in equity of a strict liability personal claim.5 It is further demonstrated that a
duty of preservation could arise in cases of deliberate misapplications by
trustees, which explains the authorities where proprietary claims were avail-
able to recover testamentary assets. Importantly, these cases provided much
of the early case law on knowing receipt. In short, the equitable regime only
arises in response to a breach of a duty of preservation, and in such cases
the underlying principle is to recover speciﬁc property which is assisted
with a potential claim for knowing receipt against third parties. It is only
in the absence of a duty of preservation where a strict liability personal
claim can be made.
II. THE EQUITABLE REGIME AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT
A. Proprietary and Personal Claims under the Equitable Regime
At this stage, it will be useful to clarify the diﬀerences between the equit-
able regime and the unjust enrichment approach. Under orthodox trust prin-
ciples, claims against third-party recipients can arise where they have
received trust property as a result of a breach of duty by a trustee or
ﬁduciary6 (for the purposes of this article, where a ﬁduciary holds or
receives identiﬁable property on behalf of another they are regarded as a
“trustee”).7 Two types of claim are available in these circumstances.8 The
ﬁrst type of claim is a proprietary one and the second type of claim is a per-
sonal one.
The proprietary claim is generally regarded as the more desirable of the
two as it oﬀers practical beneﬁts to litigants that are not provided by per-
sonal claims.9 These beneﬁts include the ability to recover property even
where the recipient is insolvent, as well as being able to bring claims
against subsequent recipients.10 This proprietary claim does, however,
have limits. A proprietary claim in equity will be defeated if the property
has been received by a good faith purchaser of the legal title,11 and the
claim can only attach to identiﬁable property either in the form of the
original trust assets or where it is traced into substitutions.12 The ability
5 See text to note 182 below.
6 Williams v Central Bank of Nigeria [2014] UKSC 10; [2014] A.C. 1189, at [31], per Lord Sumption;
and Brown v Bennett [1999] B.C.C. 525 (CA), 530, per Morritt L.J. Also, M. Conaglen and R. Nolan,
“Contracts and Knowing Receipt: Principles and Application” (2013) 129 L.Q.R. 359, at 359–60.
7 E.g. North American Land and Timber Co. Ltd. v Watkins [1904] 1 Ch. 242 (Ch), 250–51, per
Kekewich J.
8 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington L.B.C [1996] A.C. 669 (HL), 707–08, per Lord
Browne-Wilkinson.
9 As noted in FHR European Ventures L.L.P. v Mankarious [2013] EWCA Civ 17; [2014] Ch. 1, at [14],
per Lewison L.J.
10 Pennell v Deﬀell (1853) 4 De. G. M. & G. 372, 388, per Turner L.J. In Relfo [2014] EWCA Civ 360, the
court acknowledged that unjust enrichment can, in some circumstances, operate against indirect
recipients.
11 Burgess v Wheate (1759) 1 Eden 177, 195, per Clarke M.R.
12 Re Diplock [1948] Ch. 465 (CA), 521, per Greene M.R.
C.L.J. 401Claims Against Third-Party Recipients of Trust Property
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0008197317000423
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Aston University, on 28 Jul 2017 at 12:53:57, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
to trace into substitutions has proven contentious, with some academics
arguing that rights to new property can only be explained on the basis of
unjust enrichment.13 A major practical consequence of the unjust enrich-
ment analysis of tracing is that it could potentially allow the recognition
of an additional defence of change of position, which would allow the
courts to take into account detriments suﬀered by an innocent recipient
of trust property.14 In Foskett v McKeown, the unjust enrichment analysis
of tracing was rejected by the majority in the House of Lords and it was
explained that the claim for traceable proceeds is based on the vindication
of the beneﬁciary’s property rights.15 The consequence is that no change of
position defence applies to proprietary claims,16 a view that is shared in this
article and which is developed further on.17
Alongside the proprietary claim, there is a potential personal claim in
equity for knowing receipt (or “unconscionable receipt”).18 This personal
claim for knowing receipt will be useful where the recipient no longer
retains the traceable proceeds of the trust property, or where the property
has depreciated in value. As the name indicates, a successful claimant
must demonstrate that the defendant has received trust property and, in add-
ition, has the required standard of knowledge that the property was received
in breach of trust.19 The element of receipt can be established through the
successful following or tracing of the trust property.20 However, this claim
is only available where the recipient has received full “beneﬁcial receipt” of
the property, and will not be available where a third party receives trust
property on behalf of the trustee.21 A more diﬃcult issue is the degree of
knowledge required to establish this form of liability.22 Some cases had
indicated that constructive knowledge would suﬃce,23 whereas other
cases required a state of mind which is closer to dishonesty.24 The only
13 P. Birks, “Receipt” in P. Birks and A. Pretto (eds.), Breach of Trust (Oxford 2002), 218; A. Burrows,
The Law of Restitution, 3rd ed. (Oxford 2011), 169–70; R. Chambers, “Tracing and Unjust Enrichment”
in J. Neyers, M. McInnes and S. Pitel (eds.), Understanding Unjust Enrichment (Oxford 2004), 272–76.
14 Although not necessarily; see L. Smith, “Unjust Enrichment, Property and the Structure of Trust”
(2000) 116 L.Q.R. 412.
15 Foskett v McKeown [2001] 1 A.C. 102 (HL), 129, per Lord Millett.
16 E.g. Taylor v Blakelock (1886) 32 Ch. D. 560 (CA), 568, per Cotton L.J.: “anyone who took it from him
simply as a volunteer could not say that he had any better title, and would still be bound by the trusts.”
17 See text to note 163 below.
18 BCCI v Akindele [2001] Ch. 437 (CA), 455, per Nourse L.J.
19 Brown [1999] B.C.C. 525 (CA), 530, per Morritt L.J.
20 El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings [1994] 2 All E.R. 685 (CA), 700, per Hoﬀmann L.J.
21 Karak Rubber Co. Ltd. v Burden (No 2) [1972] 1 W.L.R. 602 (Ch), 632–33, per Brightman J.; Agip
(Africa) Ltd. v Jackson [1990] Ch. 265 (Ch), 291–92, per Millett J.
22 See generally A. Duke, “The Knowing Receipt ‘Knowledge’ Requirement and Restitution’s ‘Good
Faith’ Change of Position Defence: Two Sides of the Same Coin?” (2010) 35 UWA Law.Rev. 49,
67–68.
23 E.g. Karak Rubber Co. Ltd. [1972] 1 W.L.R. 602 (Ch), 632, per Brightman J.; Belmont Finance Corp
Ltd. v Williams Furniture Ltd. (No 2) [1980] 1 All E.R. 393 (CA), 405, per Buckley L.J.
24 E.g. Re Montagu’s Settlement Trusts [1987] Ch 264 (Ch), 281, per Megarry V.C.; and Eagle Trust Plc v
S.B.C. Securities Ltd. [1996] 1 B.C.L.C. 121 (Ch), 151, per Arden J.
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recurrent theme was that some degree of knowledge was required.25 At pre-
sent, the solution preferred by the courts to this issue has been to adopt a
test of “unconscionable” receipt,26 which provides a ﬂexible approach
that can be tailored depending on the context of the case before the
court. This is also explored further on in this article.27
B. Strict Liability Personal Claims in Common Law and Equity
A claim for unjust enrichment is currently available against a recipient who
is enriched at the expense of the claimant upon a recognised unjust factor
with no available defence.28 A classic example of an unjust enrichment is
where the claimant makes a mistaken payment. The receipt of such a pay-
ment traditionally only gives rise to a personal claim (although this issue
itself is not without controversy,)29 which can be satisﬁed by restitution
of an equivalent value as opposed to the return of speciﬁc property.30 If
a claim for unjust enrichment was available against a recipient of trust prop-
erty, it would be necessary to identify an “unjust factor”, with commenta-
tors focusing on the claimant’s lack of consent or the trustee’s lack of
authority for making the transfer.31 This is distinct from the approach in
knowing receipt which focuses on the conduct of the recipient. For this rea-
son, unjust enrichment is commonly referred to as a form of strict liability,
albeit one that has also been described as “fragile” due to the application of
the change of position defence.32 This defence of change of position will be
available where the recipient has, in good faith, changed their circum-
stances as a consequence of the enrichment and where the recipient
would be worse oﬀ if they were required to make restitution.33
Additionally, equity recognises a strict liability personal claim, but only
for the recovery of mistaken payments by those who are administering the
estate of a deceased person.34 At present, unlike claims for unjust enrich-
ment, recipients of such payments do not have the beneﬁt of the change
of position defence and can only escape personal liability if they stand as
25 Lord Nicholls, “Knowing Receipt: The Need for a New Landmark” in W.R. Cornish, R. Nolan,
J. O’Sullivan and G. Virgo (eds.), Restitution: Past, Present and Future (Oxford 1998), 235–36.
26 BCCI [2001] Ch. 437 (CA), 455, per Nourse L.J., as discussed in R. Nolan, “How Knowing Is Knowing
Receipt?” [2000] C.L.J. 447. Also, Arthur v Attorney General of the Turks and Caicos Islands [2012]
UKPC 30, at [33], per Sir Terence Etherton.
27 See the text following note 93 below.
28 Kleinwort Benson Ltd. v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 A.C 349 (HL), 408–09, per Lord Hope.
29 The courts have so far resisted arguments that unjust enrichment gives rise to proprietary claims;
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale [1996] A.C. 669 (HL), 708–09, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson;
and Foskett [2001] 1 A.C. 102 (HL), 127, 129, per Lord Millett.
30 E.g. Case v Roberts (1817) Holt. N.P. 500, 501, per Burrough J.
31 Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 403–08; P. Birks, An Introduction to the Law of Restitution,
revised ed. (Oxford 1989), 140–46.
32 Birks, “Receipt”, pp. 228–30.
33 A. Burrows, A Restatement of the English Law of Unjust Enrichment (Oxford 2012), 117.
34 Ministry of Health v Simpson [1951] A.C. 251 (HL), 266, per Lord Simonds.
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a good faith purchaser.35 These claims are discussed in the ﬁnal section of
this article, where it is explained that they can be readily accommodated
within an unjust enrichment analysis.
C. Changing Attitudes towards the Availability of Unjust Enrichment for
the Recovery of Trust Property
Of central importance to this article is the argument that the equitable
regime should be supplemented by a concurrent strict liability personal
claim in unjust enrichment.36 An example is the Court of Appeal decision
in Relfo v Varsani,37 although it should be noted that a similar position has
been set out in a number of lower court decisions.38 In Relfo, the claimant
was seeking to recover money which had been transferred in breach of
ﬁduciary duty to the defendant. The court concluded that the money
could be traced into the hands of the defendant who had also knowingly
received the property.39 However, it was also concluded that the claimant
would have been able to succeed on the basis of unjust enrichment. It is
notable that this discussion of unjust enrichment was unnecessary given
that the grounds for knowing receipt had been established. According to
Arden L.J., “[i]f a ﬁduciary steals trust money, the beneﬁciary can claim
back the money, or any money or asset for which it has been substituted,
from the person who has knowingly received it. A similar claim may be
made in unjust enrichment”.40 This statement is in direct conﬂict with an
earlier Court of Appeal authority, BCCI v Akindele, where Nourse L.J.
rejected the unjust enrichment analysis in the context of claims for the
receipt of trust property.41 In Relfo, no acknowledgment was made of the
controversy of introducing unjust enrichment alongside the equitable
regime. The position adopted in Relfo indicates that the courts have yet
to be fully convinced that unjust enrichment should not be concurrently
available alongside the equitable regime. It is contended in the following
section that the beneﬁciary’s inability to bring an unjust enrichment
claim cannot be solely explained by the recipient’s security of receipt nor
by the beneﬁciary’s pre-existing equitable title. Instead, it will be explained
that the equitable regime responds to the trustee’s breach of their duty of
preservation and this also provides a more convincing explanation as to
35 Whale v Booth (1784) 4 Doug. 36, 45, per Lord Mansﬁeld.
36 Birks, “Receipt”, pp. 228–30; C. Mitchell, P. Mitchell and S. Watterson (eds.), Goﬀ & Jones: The Law
of Unjust Enrichment, 8th ed. (London 2011), 8–132. For views of the judiciary, see Lord Nicholls,
“Knowing Receipt”; Lord Walker, “Dishonesty and Unconscionable Conduct in Commercial Life:
Some Reﬂections on Accessory Liability and Knowing Receipt” (2005) 27 Sydney L.R. 187, at 202;
Twinsectra v Yardley [2002] 2 A.C. 164 (HL), at [105], per Lord Millett; and Dubai Aluminium Co.
Ltd. v Salaam [2002] UKHL 48; [2003] 2 A.C. 366, at [87], per Lord Millett.
37 Relfo [2014] EWCA Civ 360.
38 See the cases at note 1 above.
39 Relfo [2014] EWCA Civ 360, at [56]–[67], per Arden L.J.
40 Ibid., at para. [1].
41 BCCI [2001] Ch. 437 (CA), 455–56, per Nourse L.J.
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why beneﬁciaries cannot bring a claim for unjust enrichment against third-
party recipients.
III. EXISTING APPROACHES TO THE EQUITABLE REGIME
A. Security of Receipt
One of the most commonly cited reasons for rejecting the availability of
unjust enrichment in claims against recipients of trust property is the pro-
tection of the recipient’s security of receipt.42 It is axiomatic that security
of receipt is an important issue, and indeed it will be argued further on
that unjust enrichment does not fully protect innocent recipients so it should
only be available in the absence of any alternative means of recovery.43
However, the security of receipt issue does not, on its own, provide a com-
pelling explanation for rejecting strict liability personal claims against reci-
pients of trust property. The reason for this position is that it is diﬃcult to
see why security of receipt should not also preclude the application of strict
liability personal claims in claims for unjust enrichment and the personal
claim in Re Diplock.44 Moreover, if the primary justiﬁcation for rejecting
unjust enrichment was to protect security of receipt then, arguably, the
aforementioned change of position defence should be recognised as an add-
itional defence for recipients of trust property. But, as it will be argued
below,45 the aim of recovering trust property transferred in breach of the
trustee’s duty would be undermined by the presence of the change of pos-
ition defence. Although the security of receipt issue is undoubtedly a con-
cern which prevents the overextension of the equitable regime, it does not
provide the sole justiﬁcation for the equitable regime as it currently stands.
B. Title-Based Claims and Defective Transfers
Another approach is provided by Smith, who contends that the basis of the
proprietary and personal claims in equity is the claimant’s continuing title
to property which has reached the hands of the recipient.46 This distin-
guishes these cases from traditional unjust enrichment claims such as mis-
taken payments, where title is lost at the moment of transfer and the basis of
the claim is a defective transfer. Under Smith’s approach, strict liability per-
sonal claims only arise for defective transfers whereas the title of the
42 Smith, “Unjust Enrichment”, pp. 431–34; G. Virgo, The Principles of the Law of Restitution, 3rd ed.
(Oxford 2015), 653–54; G. Watt, “Personal Liability for Receipt of Trust Property: Allocating the
Risks” in E. Cooke (ed.), Modern Studies in Property Law, vol. 3 (Oxford 2005), 97; J. Dietrich and
P. Ridge, “‘The Receipt of What?’: Questions Concerning Third Party Recipient Liability in Equity
and Unjust Enrichment” (2007) 31 Melbourne U.L.Rev. 47, at 65–66.
43 See Section VI(A) below.
44 It has in fact been argued that the claim in Re Diplock should become a fault-based liability; Watt,
“Personal Liability”, p. 98.
45 See text to note 163 below.
46 Smith, “Unjust Enrichment”, p. 416.
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beneﬁciary justiﬁes treating those cases diﬀerently from defective transfer
cases. Although it may appear that Smith’s view is similar to the approach
developed in this article, it is important to note that Smith’s position seems
to rely on the fact that a beneﬁciary has a pre-existing proprietary right
which entitles them to make a proprietary claim. However, that does not
seem to provide a suﬃcient distinction between claims under the equitable
regime and claims for unjust enrichment. Jaﬀey, for example, contends that
the core case of unjust enrichment, the mistaken payment, cannot be under-
stood without reference to the claimant’s initial title.47
The diﬃculty of distinguishing title-based claims and defective transfer
claims on the basis of title can be further illustrated by considering the strict
liability personal claim that is available for the recovery of mistaken trans-
fers by executors.48 Smith has argued that this strict liability personal claim
derives from the rights of the estate to recover overpayments, so that it is
not a title-based claim but a defective transfer claim.49 This is debatable
for two reasons. First, as Lord Davey explained in Harrison v Kirk, the
equitable action was introduced to maintain the creditor or legatee’s right
of recovery against the estate after the courts began to protect executors
when they had distributed assets under the decree of the court.50 If the
executor has any right to bring a claim it is an extension of the creditor
or legatee’s pre-existing rights, not the other way around.51 Second, the
claimant’s pre-existing right to recover is nonetheless a type of property
right, even though it might not be a full beneﬁcial title.52 For these reasons,
a preferable analysis would be one that explains the normative basis of the
equitable right to make a title-based claim against a third party. As will be
argued in this article, the title-based claim is dependent upon a breach of the
trustee’s duty to preserve identiﬁable property which, as will be demon-
strated below,53 is absent where an executor makes a mistaken payment.
IV. THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE EQUITABLE REGIME AND UNJUST
ENRICHMENT
The key to understanding the equitable regime is that it is a system which
works for a coherent goal, which is the recovery of property transferred in
47 P. Jaﬀey, “Classiﬁcation and Unjust Enrichment” (2004) 67 M.L.R. 1012, at 1024–25.
48 E.g. Re Diplock [1948] Ch 465 (CA).
49 Smith, “Unjust Enrichment”, pp. 443–44.
50 Harrison v Kirk [1904] A.C. 1 (HL), 6–7; also Re King [1907] 1 Ch. 72 (Ch), 78–79, per Neville
J. Early authorities, such as Harding v Edge (1682) 1 Vern 143, broadly coincide with the development
of the claim against overpaid legatees, e.g. Noel v Robinson (1682) 1 Vern 90.
51 See also Re Diplock [1948] Ch. 465 (CA), 480, where Greene M.R. noted that the payments were mis-
takes of law, which at the time would have precluded any claims from the executors against the
recipients.
52 Re Maye [2008] UKHL 9; [2008] 1 W.L.R. 315, at [17], per Lord Scott: “until the administration of the
estates was complete, [the legatee] had no proprietary interest in any particular asset of the estates, his
interest in their estates was none the less a proprietary interest.”
53 See text to note 182 below.
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breach of the trustee’s duty of preservation. Unjust enrichment relies on
“weaker” justiﬁcations for restitution such as where the claimant has
made a conscious decision to make a transfer but their intent was vitiated
or conditional. For this reason unjust enrichment only provides for restitu-
tion of the value of an enrichment, as opposed to the recovery of speciﬁc
property. The result is that unjust enrichment cannot provide any assistance
in the recovery of property transferred in breach of the trustee’s duty, and in
fact the conﬂicting rationale of unjust enrichment would only serve to
weaken the possibility of recovering speciﬁc property.
A. Recovering Property
In the preceding section, it was explained that the claimant’s right to
recover property from third parties cannot be diﬀerentiated from unjust
enrichment merely on the basis of the claimant’s original property rights.
Nonetheless, this analysis does not deny that beneﬁciaries do have propri-
etary rights in trust property. Whilst the property remains under the control
of the trustee, the beneﬁciary has a superior right to the property and will
enjoy priority over the trustee’s creditors.54 But it does not necessarily fol-
low that the right to recover property from a third party is the same right
that exists where the property is still in the hands of the trustee or
ﬁduciary.55 This approach requires a modiﬁcation of Virgo’s analysis that
such claims arise through the vindication of property rights,56 which was
also adopted in Foskett v McKeown.57 Whilst the claim is still one which
vindicates the claimant’s property rights, the precise cause of action is
the trustee’s wrongdoing.
The wrongdoing which unlocks the door to the beneﬁciary’s right to
bring a direct claim to recover property under the equitable regime is the
failure of the trustee to retain control over trust property,58 in breach of
their duty to preserve the beneﬁciary’s interests in identiﬁable property.
A duty of preservation is normally created when an express trustee or
ﬁduciary accepts to hold identiﬁable property subject to the beneﬁciary
or principal’s interests.59 This duty can also be imposed, as in resulting
or constructive trusts where the trustee is placed under “an obligation to
54 F.W. Maitland, Equity: A Course of Lectures, 2nd ed. (Cambridge 1936, repr. 2011), 112. E.g. Re
Strachan (1876) 4 Ch. D. 123 (CA).
55 Birks used a similar argument to explain cases where the claimant had a pre-existing legal proprietary
interest, and a new equitable proprietary right is created. This is not a continuation of the original prop-
erty right; P. Birks, “Property and Unjust Enrichment: Categorical Truths” (1997) New Zealand L.Rev.
623, 643–44.
56 G. Virgo, “What Is the Law of Restitution About?” in Cornish et al., Restitution.
57 Foskett [2001] 1 A.C. 102 (HL), 115 per Lord Hoﬀmann, 118 per Lord Hope and 129 per Lord Millett.
58 Attorney General v The Earl of Chesterﬁeld (1854) 18 Beav. 596, 599–600, per Sir John Romilly.
59 E.g. Hamilton v Wright (1842) 9 Cl. & F. 111, 122, per Lord Brougham: “[w]hen he afterwards
accepted the trust, it became his duty as trustee to do nothing for the impairing or destruction of the
trust.” Also Harrison v Rowley (1798) 4 Ves. Jr. 212, 215–16, per Arden M.R.
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deal with property in a particular way on behalf of another person”.60 The
recurrent theme is that a duty of preservation will only arise where the
trustee has knowledge that they hold identiﬁable property on behalf of a
beneﬁciary.61 This duty will be breached where the trustee makes an unre-
stricted transfer and can no longer preserve the beneﬁciary’s interests in the
transferred property.62 Accordingly, the beneﬁciary’s right to recover trust
property from a third-party recipient is best seen as a secondary right which,
arguably, creates a new property right where the property is no longer sub-
ject to the control of the trustee.63 The beneﬁciary’s secondary right repli-
cates the performance of the beneﬁciary’s primary rights as closely as
possible. Thus, the proprietary claim achieves what the trustee can no
longer do; it preserves the beneﬁciary’s interests in identiﬁable property
by enabling the beneﬁciary to recover speciﬁc property. This also explains
why claimants can recover substitutions made by innocent recipients. Lord
Millett has argued that the trustee has a duty to preserve the beneﬁciary’s
interests in identiﬁable property, and this primary duty can be enforced
whenever the trustee substitutes the original property for new assets.64
Since the secondary right replicates performance of the primary right, the
ability to recover traceable proceeds of trust property in the hands of a
third party operates in the same way. As Bramwell L.J. explained in Re
Smith, Fleming, & Co., the beneﬁciary should not be prevented from tra-
cing into substitutions merely as a result of the trustee’s breach of their
duty.65
Ho has contended that the accounting process can be used to explain
rights to recover property from third parties as directly enforcing the trus-
tee’s primary duty.66 But the duty is not simply for the beneﬁciary’s inter-
ests to be preserved in identiﬁable property. It is a personal duty which
must be performed by the trustee, and if a trustee makes an unrestricted
transfer they can no more control what happens with the trust property
than any other transferor who advances property to another person.67
60 Staden v Jones [2008] EWCA Civ 936, at [25], per Arden L.J. E.g. Clarke v Ramuz [1891] 2 Q.B. 456
(CA), 459–60, per Lord Coleridge C.J.
61 S. Gardner, “Moment of Truth for Knowing Receipt?” (2009) 125 L.Q.R. 20, at 23.
62 See Salway v Salway (1831) 2 Russ. & M. 215, 219–20, per Brougham L.C.
63 R. Nolan also contends that rights to recover property from third parties are secondary rights, “Equitable
Property” (2006) 122 L.Q.R. 232. A similar proposition is made by H.F. Stone, “The Nature of the
Rights of the ‘Cestui Que Trust’” (1917) 17 Colum.L.R. 467, at 476, although Stone denies that the
beneﬁciary’s rights are proprietary.
64 P. Millett, “Proprietary Restitution” in S. Degeling and J. Edelman (eds.), Equity in Commercial Law
(Sydney 2005), 315–17; Taylor v Plumer (1815) 3 M. & S. 562, 574, per Lord Ellenborough C.J.
65 E.g. Re Smith, Fleming, & Co. (1879) 11 Ch. D. 306, 316, per Bramwell L.J.
66 L. Ho, “An Account of Accounts” (2016) 28 Sing.A.L.J. 849, at 855. See also C. Mitchell and
S. Watterson, “Remedies for Knowing Receipt” in C. Mitchell (ed.), Constructive and Resulting
Trusts (Oxford 2010).
67 See Goddard v Carlisle (1821) 9 Price 169, 179, per Richards L.C.: “this instrument could not be
aﬀected, if it were shewn to be a mere voluntary deed proceeding purely from the unbiassed act of
the party; because every one has a right to dispose of his own property, in any way in which he
may think ﬁt, however foolishly he may act in so doing; and this Court cannot disturb such disposition.”
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Moreover, as Swadling has noted, merely because a claim to recover prop-
erty from a third party appears to duplicate a claim to recover property from
a trustee does not mean that they are analytically the same.68 Indeed, there
are important reasons for recognising the distinction between proprietary
claims to recover property where it is retained by the trustee and claims
to recover property from a third party. The proposition that a beneﬁciary
does not have a primary right to recover property from third parties is in
line with the general pattern in equity where the beneﬁciary’s primary
rights are against the trustee, and it is the trustee who has the power to
bring claims against third parties.69 For example, in Field v Field, the
beneﬁciary sought to prevent a trustee from leaving deeds in the hands
of solicitors.70 This request was refused as appropriate steps had been
taken by the trustees to ensure that the solicitors had safeguarded the prop-
erty. It is only where the trustee retains control over the property in the
hands of a third party that it will still be possible for the beneﬁciary to
enforce their primary rights.71
Whether the beneﬁciary is asserting their primary or secondary rights will
be important for two reasons. First, no limitation period applies where prop-
erty is retained by a third party who holds property on behalf of the trustee,72
whereas claims to recover property from a third party who receives unre-
stricted control of property are subject to a limitation period.73 Second,
third parties who hold trust property on behalf of trustees will only be liable
for dishonest assistance. This will be the case even where the third party has
knowledge that they have received trust property in breach of other trust obli-
gations.74 A knowing receipt claim can only arise where the trustee has lost
control over trust property and has breached their duty of preservation. This is
because a party who knowingly receives unrestricted control over trust prop-
erty has an unfettered choice to assist in the recovery of trust property
whereas a solicitor or bank, who is acting under the instructions of the
trustee, may be liable for breaching a separate duty to the trustee if they
refuse to act in accordance with these instructions.75
68 W. Swadling, “The Fiction of the Constructive Trust” (2011) 64 C.L.P. 399, at note 79.
69 Hayim v Citibank [1987] A.C. 730 (PC), 748, per Lord Templeman.
70 Field v Field [1894] 1 Ch. 425 (Ch), 428–29, per Kekewich J. Also, Re De Pothonier [1900] 2 Ch. 529
(Ch).
71 Which means that a beneﬁciary can still recover trust property either by bringing the trust to an end, or
by bringing a derivative claim on behalf of the trustee where the trustee is not properly exercising con-
trol over the third party.
72 E.g. Soar v Ashwell [1893] 2 Q.B. 390 (CA), as noted in Williams [2014] UKSC 10; [2014] A.C. 1189,
at [75], per Lord Neuberger.
73 Williams, ibid., at [36], per Lord Sumption. Also, P. Smith and R. Davern “I Want My (Equitable)
Property Back: Time Limits on Recovering Trust Property from Innocent Volunteers” (2015) 21
Trusts & Trustees.
74 Re Blundell (1888) 40 Ch D 370 (Ch); Brinsden v Williams [1894] 3 Ch 185 (Ch).
75 Gray v Johnston (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 1, 14, per Lord Westbury. Also Hartga v The Bank of England
(1796) 3 Ves. Jr. 55; Nickolson v Knowles (1820) 5 Madd. 47, cited with approval in Carl Zeiss
Stiftung v Herbert Smith & Co. (No 2) [1969] 2 Ch. 276 (CA), 299, per Sachs L.J.
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B. The Personal Claim for Knowing Receipt
Like the proprietary claim, the purpose of knowing receipt is to facilitate the
recovery of misapplied trust property. Knowing receipt does this by imposing
a duty on knowing recipients to assist in the recovery of trust property.76 This
duty is, however, distinguishable from the trustee’s duty of preservation. As
explained by Swadling, a third-party recipient may become subject to a “duty
to convey” property to the beneﬁciary whereas a trustee is subject to a “duty
to hold” property.77 We can only expect a recipient to be under a duty to con-
vey the property where they have suﬃcient knowledge that the property was
received in breach of the trustee’s duty of preservation.78
In contrast to the view adopted here, Mitchell and Watterson have argued
that the duty of the knowing recipient mirrors the express trustee’s duty to
account.79 These authors take the view that the recipient is under a “primary
restorative duty”, but that there is no need to show that the recipient breached
any duty.80 They cite Green v Weatherill as an example, where it was con-
cluded that an account could be requested against a knowing recipient without
an allegation of breach.81 There are two reasons for departing from Mitchell
and Watterson’s analysis. The ﬁrst reason is that even if a knowing recipient
is subject to the same duty as a trustee, it is questionable whether a trustee
can be held personally liable in the absence of a breach of duty. An account
is merely a process,82 and this process does not provide an explanation as to
why the trustee should be liable where the trust property has been lost.83
Mitchell has argued that the trustee owes a primary duty to provide substitutive
performance in the form of a debt for any shortfall.84 But the beneﬁciary does
not have a primary right to a non-speciﬁc asset in the form of a debt, as it is a
fundamental principle of trust law that there must be identiﬁable property.85
Instead it is arguably the loss of the trust property, in breach of the duty of
preservation, which provides the basis for the trustee’s personal liability. For
example, in Re Swan a trustee was held liable to account for the destruction
76 Arthur [2012] UKPC 30, at [37], per Sir Terence Etherton; Mitchell et al., Goﬀ & Jones, 8–199.
77 Swadling, “The Fiction”, p. 409.
78 See the reasoning of S. Smith, “A Duty to Make Restitution” (2013) 26 Can. J.L. and Juris. 157, 173–
74. A similar duty to help recover trust property is imposed on co-trustees where they are “ﬁxed with
knowledge” that a fellow trustee is misapplying trust property, e.g. Brice v Stokes (1805) 11 Ves. Jr.
319, 327, per Eldon L.C.
79 Mitchell and Watterson, “Remedies for Knowing Receipt”, pp. 135–36.
80 Ibid., at p. 136. Also Lord Millett, “Equity’s Place in the Law of Commerce” (1998) 114 L.Q.R. 214, at
225.
81 Green v Weatherill [1929] 2 Ch. 213 (Ch), 222, per Maugham J.
82 See L. Smith, “The Duties of Trustees in Comparative Perspective” (2016) 24 Eur.Rev.Priv.L. 1031, at
[14]: “[t]he obligation to account is an obligation to provide information.”
83 S. Worthington, “Four Questions on Fiduciaries” (2016) 2 Canadian Journal of Comparative and
Contemporary Law 723, who notes the term accounting “does not illuminate, explain or justify what
goes on”, at 764.
84 C. Mitchell, “Equitable Compensation for Breach of Fiduciary Duty” (2013) 66 C.L.P. 307, at 322–23.
85 See R. Chambers, “Liability” in Birks and Pretto, Breach of Trust, p. 4. E.g. Angove’s Pty Ltd. v Bailey
[2016] UKSC 47; [2016] 1 W.L.R. 3179, at [29], per Lord Sumption.
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of jewellery.86 According to Sargant J., the point in time when the trustee is
liable to account is when they commit a breach of trust as “the right of the
cestui que trust which was ﬁrst violated was a right to the property itself”.87
This can be seen to operate in a similar way to the principle of res ipsa loqi-
tor,88 as the very fact that the trust property has been lost will infer that, on
the balance of probabilities, the trustee has breached their obligation.89 In
turn, when Maugham J. stated in Green v Weatherill that there can be an
account without proof of a breach of duty, this may simply mean that it
will be inferred that the knowing recipient has breached their duty where
they no longer retain the trust property.90 The second reason is that, even
if one accepts that a trustee can be held personally liable in the absence of
any breach of duty,91 extending this reasoning to a third-party recipient is
more diﬃcult. As Chambers has noted, knowledge alone is not a very con-
vincing reason for imposing personal liability upon a third-party recipient.92
For this reason, it is appropriate to recognise that it is the recipient’s breach of
their duty to convey the property which gives rise to personal liability.
The concept of unconscionability provides two important functions in,
ﬁrst, identifying the degree of knowledge required for the imposition of
this duty and, second, identifying when the duty has been breached. In rela-
tion to the ﬁrst point, unconscionability enables the courts to recognise that
diﬀerent levels of enquiry may be appropriate depending on the context of
the defendant’s receipt.93 It may be appropriate to ﬁnd constructive knowl-
edge in transactions involving land, which can be “leisurely investigated”,
but not in commercial transactions where no such opportunity arises.94
Second, unconscionability also enables the courts to take into account the
defendant’s conduct in determining whether the recipient has indeed brea-
ched their duty.95 Take, for example, a defendant who discovers that they
86 Re Swan [1915] 1 Ch. 829 (Ch).
87 Ibid., at p. 836.
88 E.g. Ng Chun Pui v Lee Chuen Tat [1988] R.T.R. 298, 300–01, per Lord Griﬃths.
89 See J. Eichengrun, “Remedying the Remedy of Accounting” (1985) 60 Ind.L.J. 463, 470. But it will not
be conclusive, as where trust property is stolen, e.g. Jones v Lewis (1751) 2 Ves. Sen. 240.
90 Green [1929] 2 Ch. 213 (Ch). Notably, it was accepted that the defendant retained trust property, and
Maugham J. went on to conclude that “an account against her is therefore unnecessary”, at 222. See also
Chambers, “Liability”, p. 7.
91 Eaves v Hickson (1861) 30 Beav. 136 is commonly cited as an authority, e.g. Mitchell and Watterson,
“Remedies for Knowing Receipt”, p. 126. In contrast, Giﬀard L.J. in Re Biddulph (1868–69) L.R. 4 Ch.
App. 280 (CA) stated “I do not think it less a breach of trust because it has happened that the persons
entitled under the trusts were not known”, which would suggest that the facts of Eaves did constitute a
breach of duty.
92 See R. Chambers, “The End of Knowing Receipt” (2016) 2 Canadian Journal of Comparative and
Contemporary Law 1, at 7.
93 BCCI [2001] Ch 437 (CA), 453–55, per Nourse L.J. A point also made by Watt, “Personal Liability”.
94 Manchester Trust v Furness [1895] 2 Q.B. 539, 545, per Lindley L.J., cited with approval in BCCI,
ibid., at p. 455, per Nourse L.J.
95 E.g. Armstrong D.L.W. GmbH v Winnington Networks Ltd. [2012] EWHC 10 (Ch); [2013] Ch. 156, at
[277]–[286], per Morris Q.C. It is also notable that Lord Walker in Yeoman’s Rowe Management Ltd. v
Cobbe [2008] UKHL 55; [2008] 1 W.L.R. 1752, at [92], argued that unconscionability “should always
be used [] as an objective value judgment on behaviour”.
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have innocently received trust property, but the property is stolen by some-
one else before the property can be restored. A trustee would not be held
personally liable in such circumstances,96 and it would be inappropriate
to impose a more onerous duty on a third party than the duty of a trustee
who has accepted their position.97
C. The Conﬂicting Aims of Unjust Enrichment
In light of the analysis in the preceding section, the most obvious reason for
rejecting the application of unjust enrichment is that a claim for unjust
enrichment fails to replicate the primary right of the beneﬁciary which
relates to identiﬁable property. Unlike the equitable regime, unjust enrich-
ment focuses on reversing the abstract enrichment of the recipient, but this
does not require restitution of the original property or its traceable pro-
ceeds.98 The introduction of the unjust enrichment analysis would actually
undermine the premise of the equitable regime by sending the message to
recipients that restoration of identiﬁable trust property does not determine
the question of their personal liability. It may be argued that the introduc-
tion of unjust enrichment would at least deter recipients from deliberately
dissipating the trust property, as this would normally exclude the protection
aﬀorded by the change of position defence.99 But any recipient who seeks
to deprive the claimant of trust property would in any case be liable under
the claim for knowing receipt, and they would not be made “more liable”
by the availability of a concurrent claim for unjust enrichment.
There are good reasons for the diﬀerent approaches of the equitable
regime and unjust enrichment. Whereas the equitable regime is designed
to recover what has been lost by the trustee’s breach of duty, the law of
unjust enrichment is designed for dealing with “not-wrongs”.100 This
means that the law of unjust enrichment does not provide strong enough
justiﬁcations to allow recovery of speciﬁc property. For example, the trad-
itional basis of a claim for unjust enrichment is that the claimant has
intended to make an outright transfer but their intention was deﬁcient,
such as where the enrichment arises as a result of mistakes or failed condi-
tions.101 The conscious decision to transfer property in these cases means
that the recipient will receive unrestricted dominion over the enrichment.102
96 Morley v Morley (1678) 2 Ch. Cas. 2; Jones (1751) 2 Ves. Sen. 240; Job v Job (1877) 6 Ch. D. 562
(Ch).
97 See Re Blake [1932] 1 Ch. 54 (Ch), at 62–63, per Maugham J. Also P.J. Millett, “Restitution and
Constructive Trusts” (1998) 114 L.Q.R. 399, at 403–06.
98 P. Birks, Unjust Enrichment, 2nd ed. (Oxford 2005), 69–70.
99 E.g. E. Bant, The Change of Position Defence (Oxford 2009), 217, argues that the change of position
defence has a prophylactic aim.
100 This phrase is taken from P. Birks, “Rights, Wrongs, and Remedies” (2000) 20 O.J.L.S. 1, at 27–28.
101 Birks, An Introduction, p. 140; and also Birks, Unjust Enrichment, pp. 116–17.
102 E.g. Goddard (1821) 9 Price 169, 179, per Richards L.C. Beneﬁciaries will also lack the right to recover
property where they are responsible for transfers to third parties; Re Horne [1905] 1 Ch. 76 (Ch), 81, per
Warrington J.
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Therefore, claimants lose their right to recover speciﬁc property and
unjustly enriched recipients are only obliged to make restitution of an
equivalent sum.
It must be noted that there are some situations where proprietary claims
are increasingly available in cases that have been categorised as instances
of unjust enrichment. For example, Lord Browne-Wilkinson in
Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale v Islington L.B.C. concluded that
interests in stolen money would be protected under a constructive
trust.103 Moreover, cases of fraud are commonly dealt with using equitable
principles, either in the form of a trust or “mere equities” in the form of
rescission.104 However, as this author has previously argued there is a
very diﬀerent principle which underpins the application of the equitable
regime in cases of unauthorised transfers or where money is obtained
through deception.105 Claims that are based purely on unjust enrichment
will normally only give rise to a strict liability personal claim, but a
trust can be imposed (along with a duty to preserve property) where a
recipient has stolen property or fraudulently induced a transfer.106
Notably, just as under the equitable regime, whenever the claimant enjoys
rights under such a trust they will also be precluded from bringing an
unjust enrichment claim against subsequent recipients.107 Claims to recover
trust property and claims for unjust enrichment should, therefore, be seen
as mutually exclusive.108
V. THE ABSENCE OF ANY NEED FOR THE INTRODUCTION OF UNJUST
ENRICHMENT
The preceding section has demonstrated that unjust enrichment does not
assist in the recovery of trust property. In this section it is argued that
there are no convincing justiﬁcations for the introduction of unjust
103 Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale [1996] A.C. 669 (HL), 715–16, per Lord Browne-Wilkinson.
104 El Ajou v Dollar Land Holdings Plc [1993] 3 All E.R. 717 (Ch), 734, per Millett J.; Shalson v Russo
[2003] EWHC 1637 (Ch); [2005] Ch. 281, at [122]–[124], per Rimer J.; London Allied Holdings Ltd. v
Lee [2007] EWHC 2061 (Ch), at [276], per Etherton J. Also discussed in B. Hacker, “Proprietary
Restitution after Impaired Consent Transfers: A Generalised Power Model” [2009] C.L.J. 324.
105 D. Salmons, “The Availability of Proprietary Restitution in Cases of Mistaken Payments” [2015] C.L.J.
534. ‘This previous article touched on a number of the key issues which have been more thoroughly
explored, and some of which have been revised, in the current article, but the core argument in the pre-
vious article still stands.’
106 Ibid., at pp. 547–48; and Lord Browne-Wilkinson in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale [1996] A.
C. 669 (HL), 716. Another approach is to simply conclude that the claimant enjoys continuing property
rights in these cases; Virgo, The Principles, pp. 572–73.
107 E.g. Bank of America v Arnell [1999] Lloyd’s Rep. Bank 399 (QB), discussed at text to note 132 below.
Also Salmons, “The Availability”, pp. 561–62.
108 Although Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd. [1991] 2 A.C. 548 (HL) may be cited as contradicting this
position, Virgo points out that the claim involved the assertion of common law property rights, The
Principles, pp. 560–61. Also see Duke, “The Knowing Receipt”, pp. 58–59. Indeed, in Lipkin at
572, Lord Goﬀ implied that claims to recover common law property and claims to recover trust property
were mutually exclusive.
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enrichment in claims against third-party recipients of trust property. There
are three reasons for this position. First, it is not possible to identify an
“unjust” factor that does not conﬂict with settled principles of trusts law.
Second, unjust enrichment fails to provide greater clarity in personal claims
against recipients of trust property. Third, the perceived injustice of inno-
cent recipients who retain beneﬁts derived from dissipated trust property
is resolved through the personal liability of the trustee.
A. The Search for an Unjust Factor
First, it is diﬃcult to identify a reason why the enrichment of a third party is
“unjust” which does not conﬂict with the wider operation of the law of
trusts. If the unjust factor was “ignorance” that would undermine the
whole premise of recognising that it is the trustee who has control and
power over trust property.109 There are many acts of which the beneﬁciary
is “ignorant” of, or even may object to, but the trustee still has power to
do.110 An alternative is to focus on “absence of basis” but, to borrow an
argument from Worthington, the trustee undoubtedly does have the legal
power to transfer legal title which provides a clear basis even for deliberate
misapplications by the trustee.111
A ﬁnal possibility is that there is a lack of authority.112 However, if the
claimant is merely basing the claim on the premise of a lack of authority,
this alone cannot be suﬃcient to enable a claim for unjust enrichment.
To return to the example given earlier,113 a trustee might lack authority
to give property to a third party but they nonetheless retain control over
the trust property. In such circumstances, the beneﬁciary will be precluded
from bringing any personal claim against a third party unless that third
party has dishonestly assisted in a breach of duty.114 If a claim for unjust
enrichment could arise on the basis of a lack of authority, it would mean
that any third party who receives property on behalf of a trustee could be
liable even in the absence of dishonesty, as the change of position defence
would be precluded where the recipient has knowledge.115 To avoid the
conclusion that all third-party recipients of trust property would ﬁnd
109 Burgess (1759) 1 Eden 177, 218: “Trusts, from the nature of the thing, may be left to the honour and
faith of the trustee” (per Lord Mansﬁeld).
110 See R. Chambers and J. Penner, “Ignorance” in S. Degeling and J. Edelman (eds.), Unjust Enrichment
in Commercial Law (Sydney 2008), 257.
111 S. Worthington, Equity, 2nd ed. (Oxford 2006), 185. E.g. Lord Selbourne in Barnes v Addy (1873–74)
L.R. 9 Ch. App. 244 (CA), 251: “[t]hose who create a trust clothe the trustee with a legal power and
control over the trust property.” Also Burgess (1759) 1 Eden 177, 246, per Lord Mansﬁeld: “[i]t is
most certain, that every man who creates a trust puts his estate into the power of his trustee”; and
Thomson v Clydesdale Bank Ltd. [1893] A.C. 282 (HL), 291, per Lord Shand.
112 Chambers and Penner, “Ignorance”, pp. 260–63.
113 See text following note 74 above.
114 E.g. Maw v Pearson (1860) 28 Beav. 196, 199–200, per Romilly M.R.
115 The change of position defence will be precluded if the recipient has knowledge, e.g. Jones v Churcher
[2009] EWHC 722 (QB); [2009] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 94.
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themselves potentially liable under unjust enrichment, it has been argued
that a third party is only “enriched” where they obtain “beneﬁcial receipt”
of trust property.116 However, Hood has pointed out that third parties may
be enriched regardless of whether they receive property “beneﬁcially”.117
For example, banks use customer deposits to fund their proﬁt making activ-
ities. Indeed, both Burrows and Mitchell have conceded that receiving
banks would often ﬁnd themselves open to liability under unjust enrich-
ment, subject to the change of position defence.118 But this would represent
a radical expansion of the potential liability of banks. This is not simply an
issue which concerns security of receipt. The courts of equity traditionally
provided higher levels of protection to third parties who held property on
behalf of trustees. This is because, according to Selborne L.C. in Barnes
v Addy, if such recipients were open to strict liability personal claims it
would discourage third parties from providing their services to trustees.119
As Shadwell V.C. explained in Lockwood v Abdy, “in cases where gentle-
men act as trustees, they must, of necessity, employ solicitors, receivers,
bankers, and agents of various kinds”.120 If unjust enrichment was available
on the basis that the trustee lacked authority to transfer property to the
recipient, it would impede the ability of all trustees to carry out their duties
eﬀectively.
B. The Diﬃculties with the Fault Requirement
Second, as noted earlier,121 the most contentious issue relating to knowing
receipt has been the degree of knowledge required to establish the claim.122
Accordingly, Lord Nicholls argued extra-judicially that the solution would
be to provide beneﬁciaries with a personal claim under a form of strict
liability subject to the change of position defence.123 The purported attrac-
tion of this proposal would be that it would remove the fault requirement
from the question of liability.124 Nevertheless, the question of the defen-
dant’s fault would still be a central issue in most claims for unjust enrich-
ment. Indeed, Virgo notes that the result in most cases will be the same
whether personal liability rests on knowing receipt or unjust enrichment.125
116 R. Stevens, “Why Do Agents Drop Out?” (2005) L.M.C.L.Q. 101, 110–11.
117 P. Hood, Principles of Lender Liability (Oxford 2012), [8.187–8.190]; and Uzinterimpex J.S.C. v
Standard Bank Plc [2008] EWCA Civ 819, at [39], per Moore-Bick L.J.
118 Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 427–28; C. Mitchell, “Assistance” in Birks and Pretto, Breach of
Trust, pp. 184–85.
119 Barnes (1873–74) L.R. 9 Ch. App. 244 (CA), 252.
120 Lockwood v Abdy (1845) 14 Sim. 437, 441.
121 See the text to note 22 above.
122 E.g. Birks, “Receipt”, pp. 226–27.
123 Lord Nicholls, “Knowing Receipt”, pp. 233–34, 238.
124 Ibid., at pp. 236, 238.
125 Virgo, The Principles, p. 655. E.g. Barclays Bank Plc [2010] EWHC 1383, at [74], per Proudman J.;
MGN Ltd. [2009] EWHC 1680 (QB); [2009] All E.R. 99 (Eng), at [4], [36], per Tugendhat J.; Re
Hampton Capital Ltd. [2015] EWHC 1905 (Ch), at [67], per George Bompas Q.C.; and Dyson
Technology Ltd. v Curtis [2010] EWHC 3289 (Ch), at [129], per David Grant J.
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This is because the defence of change of position will only be available in
circumstances where the defendant has acted in good faith.126 Courts will
still need to consider the extent of the recipient’s knowledge under the
requirement of good faith in every case where the third party seeks to
defend against a claim for unjust enrichment. Moreover, the term “uncon-
scionability” is increasingly being used to deﬁne good faith in the context
of the change of position defence.127 In fact, it has been explicitly stated
that it would not be “desirable to attempt to deﬁne the limits of good
faith” as the courts have looked to maintain a similar degree of ﬂexibility
that has been developed in the context of knowing receipt claims.128 The
proposition that unjust enrichment would remove the diﬃculties in deﬁning
the fault requirement for establishing the personal liability of third-party
recipients cannot be sustained.
C. Continuing Enrichment
Third, it has been contended that the absence of a claim for unjust enrich-
ment would lead to great injustice where an innocent recipient is still ﬁnan-
cially better oﬀ despite no longer retaining misapplied property
(“continuing enrichment”).129 This is because, as noted above,130 unjust
enrichment focuses on the abstract wealth of the recipient rather than the
retention of the original property or its traceable proceeds.131 An example
will demonstrate the point. In Bank of America v Arnell, one of the defen-
dants had innocently received £25,750.132 The payment had been received
from a fraudster who convinced the recipient that this was a legitimate
transaction.133 As part of the arrangement with the fraudster, the recipient
retained £750 of the received funds.134 The defendant subsequently spent
this money “on various items as part of her general living expenses”.135
It was concluded that she was an innocent recipient, which precluded
any possible claim for knowing receipt. But if unjust enrichment had
been available in Arnell, the defendant would have still been unjustly
126 Lipkin Gorman [1991] 2 A.C. 548 (HL), 579–80, per Lord Goﬀ.
127 Niru Battery Manufacturing Co. v Milestone Trading Ltd. (No .1) [2003] EWCA Civ 1446; [2004] Q.B.
985, at [156]–[157], per Clarke L.J. More recently, Webber v Department for Education [2014] EWHC
4240 (Ch), at [62], per Nugee J.
128 Niru Battery Manufacturing Co. [2002] EWHC 1425 (Comm); [2002] 2 All E.R. (Comm) 705, at [135],
per Moore-Bick J. S. Barkehall-Thomas “Change of Position, Good Faith and Unconscionability” in
M. Bryan (ed.), Private Law Theory and Practice (London 2007), 289.
129 Birks, “Receipt”, p. 236; Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 424–31; T. Akkouh and S. Worthington,
“Re Diplock (1948)” in C. Mitchell and P. Mitchell (eds.), Landmark Cases in the Law of Restitution
(Oxford 2006), 297.
130 See text to note 98 above.
131 Birks, “Receipt”, p. 236.
132 Bank of America [1999] Lloyd’s Rep. Bank 399 (QB).
133 Ibid., at paras.[16]–[17], per Aikens J.
134 This arrangement could have provided the basis for a good faith purchaser defence but this possibility
was not explored. For the purposes of the example, this is treated as a voluntary payment.
135 Bank of America [1999] Lloyd’s Rep. Bank 399 (QB), at [4.7].
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enriched at the claimant’s expense by the receipt of the £750 whether or not
she retained any traceable proceeds as she had spent the money “in the
ordinary course of things”.136
The problem with any perceived “injustice” created by the result in
Arnell is that it overlooks the fact that it is the trustee who bears sole
responsibility for the loss of the property by making an unrestricted transfer
to the innocent recipient in the ﬁrst place.137 Therefore, the loss of trust
property by an unknowing third party should be resolved through the per-
sonal liability of the trustee. As stated by Romilly M.R. in Browne v Butter,
“if a trustee so deals with a trust fund as to allow a third party to obtain the
control over it, whereby it is afterwards lost, he becomes liable for a breach
of trust by acting beyond the scope of his authority”.138 Admittedly, in
some cases, it may not be possible to successfully sue the trustee.139 For
example, the trustee may lack the funds to provide compensation. But
the inability of a wrongdoer to pay compensation is an unconvincing reason
for imposing liability on an innocent party.140 Another possibility is that the
trustee may be protected by an exclusion clause. Nonetheless, if that is the
case, this is a risk that the settlor will have accepted and there cannot be any
complaint if this risk eventuates. There is simply no need to impose liability
for continuing enrichment, as any losses which result from the dissipation
of the trust property by an innocent recipient should be exclusively gov-
erned by the trustee’s liability.
VI. THE POSITION OF THIRD PARTIES
The ﬁnal reason for rejecting the introduction of unjust enrichment for
claims to recover trust property is that it would provide an unfair burden
on innocent recipients. Any expansion of liability will introduce additional
risks for innocent recipients and the change of position defence does not
ensure suﬃcient protection. In fact, even supporters of the unjust enrich-
ment approach have conceded that the concurrence of a strict liability per-
sonal claim and the existing proprietary claim in equity would be unfairly
prejudicial to innocent recipients unless further protection is aﬀorded to
those who retain misapplied property.141 But this would result in the overall
weakening of the equitable regime as a means of recovering misapplied
property.
136 Lipkin Gorman [1991] 2 A.C. 548 (HL), 580, per Lord Goﬀ.
137 E.g. Clough v Bond (1838) 3 My. & C. 490.
138 Browne v Butter (1857) 24 Beav. 159, 161–62.
139 Akkouh and Worthington, “Re Diplock (1948)”, p. 298.
140 As it is in other areas of private law, e.g. International Energy Group Ltd. v Zurich Insurance plc [2015]
UKSC 33; [2016] A.C. 509: “[i]nsurers have deep pockets, but that in itself cannot justify imposing on
them a liability which they have not agreed”, at [171], per Lord Hodge.
141 E.g. Birks, “Receipt”, p. 221; and Burrows, The Law of Restitution, p. 547.
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A. Innocent Recipients and Continuing Enrichment
If an unjust enrichment claim is available against a recipient of trust prop-
erty, much will rest on the operation of the change of position defence. It is
argued here that the change of position defence does not ensure suﬃcient
protection for innocent recipients. There are two reasons why unjust enrich-
ment will place an unwelcome burden on innocent recipients; the ﬁrst
relates to the bargaining power of litigants, and the second relates to the
diﬃculties of establishing precisely how the enrichment has been lost. In
regard to the ﬁrst reason, the classiﬁcation of knowledge as part of the
cause of action or the defence is important in showing who has the burden
of proving the recipient’s state of mind.142 Whereas in knowing receipt the
burden of proving the knowledge of the recipient is imposed on the claim-
ant, in unjust enrichment the defendant has the burden of proving good
faith.143 This may seem like a subtle distinction, but it should not be
assumed that it is an insigniﬁcant one. As Smith has noted, “[a]lthough
there may be no diﬀerence in the classroom between fault-based liability
and strict liability with defences, there is a great diﬀerence in the court-
room”.144 By placing the burden on the defendant it is more likely that a
defendant would seek to minimise the risks of litigation by agreeing to
make restitution, even when they have a strong argument that they have
changed their position.145
The second reason is that the recipient is required to demonstrate their
innocent state of mind and also that the loss of the enrichment was due
to an extraordinary expenditure.146 In regard to the recipient’s state of
mind, it has been argued by Kiri that the burden of proof should be placed
on the recipient as they are the party that will be better placed to supply this
evidence.147 But the diﬃculties in proving the recipient’s state of mind are
not insurmountable,148 and, given the potentially onerous nature of per-
sonal liability for the receipt of trust property, it is appropriate that the
claimant has the burden of proving the recipient’s state of mind. Also, prov-
ing that an expenditure was “extraordinary” is often far from an easy task.
Phillip Collins Ltd. v Davis provides a good example.149 In Phillip, the
142 K. Low, “Recipient Liability in Equity” (2008) R.L.R 96, at 105; Law Society v Habitable Concepts
Ltd. [2010] EWHC 1449 (Ch), at [15], per Norris J.
143 Re Polly Peck (No 3) (CA, 17 March 1993), section 8, per Hoﬀmann L.J. Also Polly Peck International
Plc v Nadir (No 2) [1992] 4 All E.R .769 (CA), 781–82, per Scott L.J.
144 Smith, “Unjust Enrichment”, p. 434.
145 C. Harpum, “Knowing Receipt: The Need for a New Landmark: Some Reﬂections” in Cornish et al.,
Restitution, p. 250.
146 Lipkin Gorman [1991] 2 A.C. 548 (HL), 580, per Lord Goﬀ; Test Claimants in the FII Group Litigation
v Revenue and Customs Commissioners [2014] EWHC 4302 (Ch), at [353], per Henderson J.
147 N. Kiri, “Recipient and Accessory Liability: Where Do We Stand Now” (2006) 21 J.I.B.L.R. 611, at
614.
148 The courts have been prepared to draw an inference of knowledge even in the absence of direct evi-
dence, as in Agip (Africa) Ltd. [1990] Ch. 265 (Ch), 293–95, per Millett J.
149 Phillip Collins Ltd. v Davis [2000] 3 All E.R. 808 (Ch). Also Virgo, The Principles, p. 690.
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defendants had received overpayments but were trying to argue that they
had changed their position. To establish the change of position defence,
these defendants were required to demonstrate that they had altered their
circumstances in relation to periodical overpayments over six years.
Parker J. concluded that he was “unable to ﬁnd that any particular item
of expenditure was directly referable to the overpayments of royalties”.150
A pragmatic conclusion was reached whereby the defendants were entitled
to a defence of 50% for the sums received due to their change in life-
style,151 but even this solution does not guarantee that an innocent party
will not be unfairly burdened.
The predicament of the defendants in Phillip provides a stark illustration
of the diﬃculties that may be faced by defendants in establishing the
defence of change of position. Although Burrows has contended that courts
should not require defendants “to account precisely for how they” spend
enrichments,152 there is no guarantee that defendants will ﬁnd that all
judges will show similar pragmatism. For example, in the more recent
case of MGN Ltd. v Horton, Tugendhat J. indicated that a defendant
would need to provide a full account of any expenditure by demonstrating
that each expenditure was attributable to the enrichments.153 A further con-
cern is that the courts may take an unduly narrow approach to the types of
detriment that will be relevant under this defence. In Scottish Equitable v
Derby, the Court of Appeal rejected the change of position defence despite
the fact that, because of an overpayment, the recipient had “begun to accus-
tom himself to a standard of living and a level of security beyond his true
means”.154 As Dietrich and Ridge have noted, strict liability subject to the
change of position defence is “potentially oppressive in all cases”.155 This
is unavoidable in traditional unjust enrichment scenarios as the claimant
lacks any other means of recovering the enrichment. But, given that the
beneﬁciary’s rights are suﬃciently protected by their ability to recover
trust property and their right to sue the trustee, the addition of unjust enrich-
ment simply adds an unnecessary risk for innocent third parties of trust
property.
B. The Potential Impact on the Proprietary Claim
Even if one takes the view that the change of position defence does provide
suﬃcient protection for innocent recipients, it would still be necessary to
reconsider the scope of the existing proprietary claim for the recovery of
150 Philip Collins Ltd., ibid., at p. 829.
151 See also Burrows, The Law of Restitution, pp. 535–36.
152 Ibid., at p. 535.
153 MGN Ltd. [2009] EWHC (QB) 1680; [2009] All E.R. 99 (Eng), at [33]. See also J. Edelman, “The
Change of Position Defence: A Defence of Unjust Disenrichment” (2012) 92 B.U.L.Rev. 1009, at 1013.
154 Scottish Equitable v Derby [2001] EWCA Civ 369; [2001] 3 All E.R. 818, at [52], per Brown L.J.
155 Dietrich and Ridge, “‘The Receipt of What?’”, p. 83.
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trust property. This is because any recipient who had changed their position
would still be left worse oﬀ if they retained any traceable proceeds of the
trust property. It is notable that Lord Millett advocated the unjust enrich-
ment analysis for the personal liability of third-party recipients, but rejected
the application of the change of position defence in claims which were con-
tingent upon tracing.156 By contrast, some of the strongest supporters of the
unjust enrichment analysis have recognised that a personal claim for unjust
enrichment alongside the existing proprietary claim in equity would oﬀer
too much protection for beneﬁciaries to the detriment of innocent recipi-
ents.157 For this reason, Birks argued that the change of position defence
should also be available for those who retain the traceable proceeds of
trust property.158 Burrows has also argued that the failure to harmonise
the personal and proprietary claims would allow claimants to “outﬂank
the change of position defence”.159 According to Bryan, this would create
“tactical opportunities” and he describes this as an “undesirable
outcome”.160
A ﬁrst point to mention is that it is commonly accepted by authors such
as Birks and Burrows that proprietary claims to recover the original prop-
erty are not examples of unjust enrichment.161 These authors have, instead,
argued that unjust enrichment underpins proprietary claims where the prop-
erty is traced into substitute assets. This means that the introduction of the
change of position defence for those who retain the traceable proceeds of
trust property would only provide a partial solution to the overburdening
of recipients. For those innocent recipients who retain the original property,
the claimant would still have the choice of pursuing a proprietary claim
which is not subject to the change of position defence as well as a strict
liability personal claim in unjust enrichment.162 If the central justiﬁcation
for recognising the change of position defence in proprietary claims against
third parties is that the claimant could circumvent its operation in personal
claims, this outcome is inevitable where the recipient retains the original
property.
The second point is that, even if we ignore the plight of innocent recipi-
ents who retain the original trust property, the availability of the change of
position defence in claims for the recovery of the traceable proceeds of trust
property would only serve to reduce the chances of recovering misapplied
156 Millett, “Proprietary Restitution”, p. 325. The defence was rejected in Foskett [2001] 1 A.C. 102 (HL),
129, per Lord Millett.
157 Birks, “Receipt”, p. 221; and Burrows, The Law of Restitution, p. 547.
158 Birks, ibid., at pp. 221, 238.
159 Burrows, The Law of Restitution, p. 547.
160 M. Bryan, “The Criteria for the Award of Proprietary Remedies: Rethinking the Proprietary Base” in
Bryan, Private Law Theory and Practice, p. 282.
161 Birks, “Receipt”, p. 216; Burrows, The Law of Restitution, p. 169.
162 Birks, “Property and Unjust Enrichment”, p. 653: “[t]he rational way forward is therefore for equity to
back up its vindicatio with obligations born of wrongs and obligations born of unjust enrichment.”
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property. The point is made eﬀectively by Fox, who explains that “it would
erode the security of property if vindicatory actions could be defeated by
questions about the justice of the defendant’s being required to make full
restitution”.163 This provides a decisive reason for rejecting the change of
position defence in proprietary claims against third parties. In short, unless
the courts are going to make substantial changes to the proprietary claim by
weakening the beneﬁciary’s rights to recover misapplied property, the intro-
duction of a personal claim for unjust enrichment would impose a burden
on innocent recipients which cannot be justiﬁed.
VII. APPLYING THIS ANALYSIS TO RE DIPLOCK
The simple conclusion to be drawn from the discussion so far is that it is
inappropriate to aﬀord claimants rights to bring strict liability personal
claims in addition to rights to recover speciﬁc property. This analysis can
be further illustrated by returning to the line of authorities that preceded
the decision in Re Diplock.164 In Re Diplock, the Court of Appeal con-
cluded that it was possible for general legatees to bring proprietary claims,
in addition to strict liability personal claims, against the recipients of mis-
taken payments by the executors.165 It is important to deal with this case as
Re Diplock is the only clear authority to support the proposition that it is
possible to have a strict liability personal claim as well as an equitable pro-
prietary claim on the same set of facts.166 However, as it will be demon-
strated,167 the personal claim in Re Diplock was developed as a strict
liability claim for the recovery of abstract wealth, and the proprietary
claim recognised by the Court of Appeal in that case lacked support in prin-
ciple and authority.
There are three reasons for reaching this conclusion. The ﬁrst reason is
that the mistaken payments represented a “devastavit” which is a waste
of assets by the executor but which is also distinct from a trustee’s
breach of their duty to preserve trust property.168 The second reason is
that the authorities before Re Diplock precluded the general availability
of a proprietary claim to recover payments made under devastavit.169 The
third reason is that the courts would allow a proprietary claim only
where an executor knew that the transfer would prejudice those entitled
163 D. Fox, “Legal Title as a Ground of Restitutionary Liability” [2000] R.L.R. 465, at 488.
164 Re Diplock [1948] Ch. 465 (CA).
165 Ibid., at pp. 556–57.
166 Ibid., at pp. 556–57. Following this decision, there were a number of cases which accepted the possi-
bility that Re Diplock could be applied against recipients of trust property; G.L. Baker Ltd. v Medway
Building and Supplies Ltd. [1958] 1 W.L.R. 1216 (Ch), 1220, per Danckwerts J.; Eddis v Chichester
Constable [1969] 1 W.L.R. 385 (Ch), 388, per Goﬀ J.; Butler v Broadhead [1975] Ch. 97 (Ch),
108, per Templeman J.; Re J. Leslie Engineers Co. Ltd. [1976] 1 W.L.R. 292 (Ch), 299, per Oliver J.
167 See the text to note 187 below.
168 Bahin v Hughes (1886) 31 Ch. D. 390 (CA), 393, per Cotton L.J.
169 See text after note 194 below.
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under the estate.170 These cases of misapplications provided a number of
the early authorities for the development of the knowing receipt claim
against third parties.171 The development of this fault-based liability
demonstrates that the strict liability personal claim did not co-exist along-
side the claim to recover speciﬁc property from third parties.
A. The Nature of the Legatee’s Rights
There are a number of reasons for questioning the basis of the proprietary
claim in Re Diplock. In Re Diplock, the main authorities relied on to estab-
lish the proprietary claim for the mistaken payments were the decisions in
Re Hallett’s Estate and Sinclair v Brougham, and neither case concerns the
availability of proprietary responses in the administration of estates.172
Only ﬁve other authorities were referenced in the Court of Appeal’s discus-
sion of the proprietary claim, but only one of those authorities, Re Blake,
related to claims for testamentary property.173 It was even noted by
Greene M.R. that Re Blake ruled out the possibility of a proprietary
claim against third parties.174 Moreover, Akkouh and Worthington have
pointed out that the court’s reliance upon Sinclair is questionable in light
of modern judicial treatment of the reasoning applied in Sinclair.175
There were two limbs to the court’s reasoning that a proprietary claim
was available in Re Diplock and both reveal that the reasoning was
ﬂawed. First, it was stated that claimants can trace in equity where there
is a ﬁduciary duty or an existing proprietary interest.176 Second, as the lega-
tees enjoyed a type of equitable proprietary interest, a proprietary claim was
available.177 With regard to the ﬁrst proposition, the question of whether
one can trace, which is the question that the court asked in Re Diplock,
is not the same as asking whether the claimant has a proprietary
claim.178 Tracing is merely a process and it does not establish a right to
recover property.179 Furthermore, it is indeed correct that the presence of
a ﬁduciary duty can be an important factor in identifying the availability
170 E.g. Hill v Simpson (1802) 7 Ves. Jr. 152.
171 C. Harpum, “The Stranger as Constructive Trustee: Part 2” (1986) 102 L.Q.R. 267, 273.
172 Re Hallett’s Estate (1880) 13 Ch. D. 696 (CA); Sinclair v Brougham [1914] A.C. 398 (HL).
173 The authorities discussed in the decision were: Banque Belge v Hambrouck [1921] 1 K.B. 321 (CA); In
re Guardian Permanent Beneﬁt Building Society (1882) 23 Ch. D. 440 (CA); Devayne v Noble
(Clayton’s Case) (1816) 1 Mer. 572; Re Stenning [1895] 2 Ch. 433 (Ch); Re Blake [1932] 1 Ch. 54
(Ch).
174 Re Diplock [1948] Ch. 465 (CA), 544, per Greene M.R.; Re Blake [1932] 1 Ch. 54 (Ch), 63–64, per
Maugham J.
175 Akkouh and Worthington, “Re Diplock (1948)”, p. 304. Much of the reasoning in Sinclair was eﬀec-
tively overruled by the House of Lords in Westdeutsche Landesbank Girozentrale [1996] A.C. 669
(HL), as discussed in Haugesund Kommune v Depfa A.C.S. Bank [2010] EWCA Civ 579; [2012]
Q.B. 549, at [65]–[80], per Aikens L.J.
176 Re Diplock [1948] Ch. 465 (CA), 520.
177 Ibid., at p. 530.
178 L. Smith, The Law of Tracing (Oxford 1997), 11–14.
179 Foskett [2001] 1 A.C. 102 (HL), 113 per Lord Steyn, 120 per Lord Hope and 128 per Lord Millett.
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of a proprietary claim against a third party. However, it is not simply the
presence of a ﬁduciary duty which is important in establishing proprietary
claims against third parties, but that the position of the ﬁduciary must entail
a duty of preservation in relation to identiﬁable property. For example, an
agent is a ﬁduciary but the principal would have no proprietary claim if the
agent is permitted to mix the proceeds of a sale of property with their
own.180 For the second proposition, it has been demonstrated earlier in
this article that even beneﬁciaries do not have a general right to bring a dir-
ect claim to recover trust property from a third party.181 There must in fact
be a transfer made in breach of the duty of preservation in relation to iden-
tiﬁable property.
The problem in Re Diplock is that, whilst an executor owes a duty to pre-
serve the general wealth of the estate for creditors or legatees,182 this does
not constitute a duty to preserve interests in identiﬁable property for any
particular beneﬁciary.183 This is because, during administration, the execu-
tor will not necessarily know who is entitled to the assets.184 As explained
by Viscount Radcliﬀe in Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Livingston, “until
administration was complete no one was in a position to say what items of
property would need to be realised for the purposes of that administration or
of what the residue, when ascertained, would consist or what its value
would be”.185 Even in cases where a speciﬁc legacy is left to a legatee,
until the executor assents, the legatee does not have title in relation to
any speciﬁc property.186
B. The Strict Liability Personal Claim in Re Diplock
The executor’s position is also important in understanding the personal
claim in Re Diplock. The personal claim works on the basis that the cred-
itors or legatees have a right to satisfaction from the assets of the estate,
which may be lost where assets have been received by a third party
under a mistaken payment by an executor. This is demonstrated by the
rule that no claim for repayment could be made against an overpaid
180 Henry v Hammond [1913] 2 K.B. 515, 521, per Channell J. It may be diﬀerent if the agent has acted
fraudulently; In re Hindmarsh (1860) 1 Drew. & Sm. 129, 132, per Kindersley.
181 See text to note 71 above. That does not prevent a derivative claim, as in Soar [1893] 2 Q.B. 390 (CA),
where the beneﬁciary recovered property on behalf of the trustee. But the executors would not have had
standing themselves to bring a proprietary claim where they had acted under a mistake of law.
182 Dr Barnardo’s Homes v Special Income Tax Commissioners [1921] 2 A.C. 1 (HL), 8, per Viscount
Finlay.
183 Executors are not, strictly speaking, subject to duties as trustees; e.g. Dacre v Patrickson (1860) 1 Drew.
& Sm. 182, 185, per Kindersley V.C.: “[q]uâ executor, he cannot have a trust imposed upon him by the
will.”
184 Johnson v Newton (1853) 11 Hare. 160, 167–69, per Page Wood V.C.
185 Commissioner of Stamp Duties v Livingston [1965] A.C. 694 (PC), 708, per Viscount Radcliﬀe.
186 Mead v Lord Orrery (1745) 3 Atk. 235, 238, per Lord Hardwicke. Also Attenborough v Solomon [1913]
A.C. 76 (HL), 83, per Viscount Haldane.
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recipient when a shortfall arises after the overpayment.187 Therefore, the
claimant only has standing to bring a claim on the basis that a reduction
in the wealth of the estate is attributable to the transfer to the recipient.
In this way, the strict liability personal claim is an appropriate means for
recovery as it reﬂects the primary rights of the creditors and legatees during
administration, which is protected by the executor’s duty to preserve the
value of the estate as opposed to a duty to preserve identiﬁable property.
This personal claim could be assimilated under an unjust enrichment ana-
lysis, with the unjust factor being the “deprivation of assets for the distri-
bution of the estate”.188
This raises the question of whether the change of position defence should
be similarly available for these claims. There is early authority which indi-
cates that hardships suﬀered by recipients are not taken into account by the
court, such as David v Frowd.189 But this must be placed in context. When
the courts of equity began to permit the release of legacies without requir-
ing security,190 this was on the basis that “everybody taking a residue must
know that he takes it subject to the testator’s liabilities, and takes the risk of
its afterwards turning out that there are undiscovered liabilities”.191
According to modern authorities, taking the risk that there could be an obli-
gation to return an enrichment would preclude the availability of the change
of position defence.192 It can be argued that it is no longer the case that all
recipients of mistaken payments by executors will be aware they may be
required to repay, and it would be ﬁctional for the courts to ignore evidence
presented by recipients that they were unaware of this risk. Furthermore, in
principle, it seems that the courts always had the power to take into account
hardships suﬀered by recipients. For example, in Johnson v Johnson, Lord
Alvanley explained that a common law claim for money had and received
(the precursor to the modern law of unjust enrichment) was not permitted
against the recipient of a mistaken payment by an executor, as it was
only in equity where the court could take into account “the mode in
which the funds might have been applied”, otherwise “great injustice
may arise”.193 There is, therefore, a compelling case for the application
of the change of position defence, which was yet to be developed at the
187 Re Diplock [1948] Ch. 465 (CA), 487–88, 493–95; Orr v Kaines (1751) 2 Ves. Sen. 194; Peterson v
Peterson (1866–67) L.R. 3 Eq. 111 (Ch).
188 Similar phrasing was used in Re Diplock [1948] Ch. 465 (CA), 503–04.
189 David v Frowd (1833) 1 My. & K. 200, 211, per Leach M.R.
190 See Jewon v Grant (1677) 3 Swans. 659, 660, per Lord Nottingham.
191 Jervis v Wolferstan (1874) L.R. 18 Eq. 18, 26–27, per Jessel M.R. Also Prowse v Spurgin (1867–68)
L.R. 5 Eq 99, 102, per Romilly M.R., where it was noted that a legatee enters into “an undertaking, not
expressed, but clearly understood according to the practice of the Court, that he will repay the amount, if
any, by which he has been overpaid”.
192 E.g. Goss v Chilcott [1996] A.C. 788 (PC), 799, per Lord Goﬀ.
193 Johnson v Johnson (1802) 3 Bos. & P. 162, 169. Also Blake v Gale (1886) L.R. 32 Ch. D. 571, 580, per
Cotton L.J.: “the right of the creditors to proceed against the residuary legatees is simply a right given
by equity in order that justice may be done.”
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time of Johnson and Re Diplock, to ensure that claims to reverse transfers of
abstract wealth which result from mistakes by executors are treated with the
same degree of justice as similar claims in unjust enrichment.
C. The Absence of Proprietary Claims in Cases of Mistake
The incompatibility of this strict liability personal claim alongside claims to
recovery speciﬁc property is reﬂected in the dearth of support for the avail-
ability of a proprietary claim in the cases that preceded Re Diplock. In cases
of mistaken payments by executors, the courts would provide the legatee or
creditor with the personal claim, with no mention of any proprietary
claim.194 Admittedly, there are some instances where the language used
by the courts seemed to indicate a proprietary response. For example, in
many of the cases it was stated that the legatee or creditor could “follow”
the property into the hands of the recipient.195 Nevertheless, as noted in
the latest edition of Williams, Martyn and Sunnocks, this simply meant
that a personal claim could be made against the recipient.196 The phrase
“follow the assets” normally referred to the type of situation that Birks
described as “leapfrogging”, whereby a claimant seeks to establish a per-
sonal claim against indirect recipients.197 An ability to bring a claim against
an indirect recipient does not necessarily demonstrate the presence of a pro-
prietary right and the language of “following the assets” tells us little about
the nature of the claim. More telling is the fact that the claim was generally
regarded as a personal one, as revealed by Lord Cottenham L.C.’s statement
in March v Russell where it was explained that a claimant’s interest in over-
paid assets is protected by “the personal liability of the legatee”.198
There are at least some authorities to support the availability of a propri-
etary claim in this context, with the strongest example being Brooksbank v
Smith.199 But on closer analysis, this case is quite distinct from Re Diplock.
In Brooksbank, the defendant had received shares on the basis that the
executors had been informed his wife had survived the testatrix when in
fact she had not. It was held that there was a speciﬁc lien on behalf of
the legatees. A signiﬁcant factor in this case appeared to be that the execu-
tors had been misinformed of the survival of the defendant’s wife. The case
was treated as one that was comparable to fraud for limitation purposes and
it is entirely possible that the basis of the case is closer to the earlier men-
tioned situations where a trust is imposed on a party who obtains property
194 E.g. in David (1833) 1 My. & K. 200, 206, where counsel for the defendants explained that the claim
was not for any speciﬁc property but rather “something equivalent to a fund”.
195 E.g. Newman v Barton (1690) 2 Vern. 205. See also Law of Property Amendment Act 1859, s. 29.
196 J.R. Martyn and N. Caddick (eds.), Williams, Martyn and Sunnocks: Executors, Administrators and
Probate, 20th ed. (London 2015), [83-02].
197 Birks, Unjust Enrichment, pp. 86–89; and also considered in Relfo [2014] EWCA Civ 360, at [95]–[96],
per Arden L.J.
198 March v Russell (1837) 3 My. & C. 31, 42, per Cottenham L.C.
199 Brooksbank v Smith (1836) 2 Y. & C. Ex. 58.
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by deception.200 Another authority is West v Roberts where the mistaken
recipient of shares was ordered to return them in specie.201 The claim suc-
ceeded on the basis that the claimant was a speciﬁc legatee and that there
had been an assent by the executors.202 An assent gives the legatee full
legal title to the property and Swinfen Eady J. recognised that, in the
absence of an assent, the legatee would not have any general right to
demand the return of the shares.203 Therefore, the case is actually an author-
ity for the proposition that the proprietary claim should not have been avail-
able in Re Diplock as the executors had not assented and neither were the
claimants speciﬁc legatees.
A further example is Noble v Brett where a creditor sought to recover
money from the legatees.204 In Noble, the residuary legatee was insolvent
but the executors retained property as trustees for the other legatees.
Romilly M.R. seemed to accept that “the right of the creditor and that of
the executor to attach the fund itself is limited to the case where the execu-
tor or the Court has not parted with the control over it”.205 Similarly, in
Dibbs v Goren, a lien was imposed but only in relation to funds which
were still under the control of the executors.206 Once more, this undermines
the conclusion in Re Diplock, where the property was no longer retained by
the executors or the court and was instead under the control of the recipi-
ents. It is also worth noting that, in Noble, no enquiry was made whether
any of the money was retained by the residuary legatee. If a proprietary
claim had been available, this would have enabled the creditor to also
recover from the recipient.207 Likewise, in Todd v Studholme, the essential
issue was that a number of creditors had been overpaid, but part of the
money could not be recovered due to the insolvency of some of the recipi-
ents.208 Once more, no attempt was made to identify any remaining prop-
erty in the hands of the insolvent recipients. Sir Page Wood V.C. even
noted that no lien attached to property purchased under an equitable mort-
gage as the personal right to recover from the other recipients meant that the
claimant’s “remedy is already ample”.209
Finally, claimants who sought to recover overpayments were denied the
practical beneﬁts that would have attached to proprietary claims. In Jervis v
Wolferstan, claims for overpayments were restricted to the original value
received, and it was not possible to “recover any of the income”.210
200 See text at note 106 above.
201 West v Roberts [1909] 2 Ch. 180 (Ch).
202 Ibid., at p. 186.
203 Ibid., at p. 185.
204 Noble v Brett (1858) 24 Beav. 499, 508.
205 Ibid., at p. 510.
206 Dibbs v Goren (1849) 11 Beav. 483.
207 Burdett v Willett (1708) 2 Vern. 638; Taylor (1815) 3 M. & S. 562.
208 Todd v Studholme (1857) 3 Kay. & J. 324.
209 Ibid., at p. 338. See also Graham v Drummond [1896] 1 Ch. 968, 976, per Romer J.
210 Jervis (1874) L.R. 18 Eq 18 (Ch), 27, per Jessel M.R.
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Similarly, in Gittins v Steele it was concluded that interest could only be
recovered where the court held property but not where assets had been
received by legatees.211 Although the position today is that the courts
have wider powers to recover interest for personal claims,212 this was not
the case at the time of these decisions.213 Since this was the core issue in
Gittins v Steele, it seems odd that the claimants pursued interest under a
strict liability personal claim when interest would have readily been avail-
able for a proprietary claim. The only logical conclusion is that it was gen-
erally recognised that no proprietary claim was possible alongside the strict
liability personal claim.
D. Proprietary Claims for Wrongdoings by Executors and Recipients
There were, however, certain situations where a proprietary claim would
become available. It was noted earlier that the knowledge and actions of
a legal owner can justify the imposition of a trust, along with a duty of pres-
ervation, in relation to identiﬁable property.214 Similarly, a duty of preser-
vation would be imposed where the executor misapplied property knowing
that it would deprive the assets of the estate from those who were entitled as
creditors or legatees.215 As a result, proprietary claims could be made to
recover these transfers. Such cases are clearly distinct from the circum-
stances of Re Diplock, where the transfer was made under a genuine, albeit
mistaken, belief that the recipients were entitled to the property. In Nugent v
Giﬀord, it was stated that property could not generally be followed “as spe-
ciﬁck assets” where it had been transferred by an executor, but that “[t]his
court will indeed follow assets upon voluntary alienations by collusion of
the executor”.216 Similarly, in Harford v Lloyd the executor misapplied
property by making a transfer to a third party who invested the money
into securities and the beneﬁciary was permitted a charge over the secur-
ities.217 A further example is Midgley v Midgley, where the executor had
made a payment to the recipient’s solicitor for a debt against the estate des-
pite being aware that the debt was not recoverable.218 The claimants recov-
ered the money under a proprietary claim.219
There are also those cases where the recipient had obtained property
through deception and this justiﬁed the imposition of a trust which in
211 Gittins v Steele (1818) 1 Swans. 199, 200, per Eldon L.C.
212 Sempra Metals Ltd. v I.R.C. [2007] UKHL 34; [2008] 1 A.C. 561.
213 As noted by Greene M.R. in Re Diplock [1948] Ch. 465 (CA), 517. E.g. Moons v De Bernales (1826) 1
Russ. 301, 306, per Lord Giﬀord.
214 See text to note 106 above. E.g. Mead (1745) 3 Atk. 235, 238–40, per Lord Hardwicke.
215 Docker v Somes (1834) 2 My. & K. 655, 665, per Brougham L.C.
216 Nugent v Giﬀord (1738) 1 Atk. 463, 463–64, per Lord Hardwicke; and Crane v Drake (1708) 2 Vern.
616.
217 Harford v Lloyd (1855) 20 Beav. 310, 321, per Sir John Romilly. The same principle applied to powers
of appointment; Townshend v Windham (1750) 2 Ves. Sen. 1, 10–11, per Lord Hardwicke.
218 Midgley v Midgley [1893] 3 Ch. 282 (Ch), aﬀd (CA).
219 Ibid., at p. 290, per Romer J.
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turn enabled a claim to recover the transferred property.220 As noted
above,221 Brooksbank v Smith would fall within this scenario and another
example is Consett v Bell, where the recipient had deceived the executor
into making a payment that was not due under the will.222 The court in
Consett recognised that the claimant would have the right to recover speciﬁc
property in this type of situation.223 In both Brooksbank and Consett, the
claimant’s proprietary rights can be justiﬁed by the imposition of a trust,
along with a duty of preservation, against those who fraudulently induce
transfers. This ﬁts with a number of clear judicial statements which recog-
nised that executors had the right to make dispositions of property, and to
give the recipient good title, unless the recipient had acted in bad faith.224
This may appear to simply reﬂect the operation of the good faith purchaser
defence, however it is implicit that the word “disposition” includes distribu-
tions to volunteers.225 Moreover, whereas the burden of demonstrating good
faith under the good faith purchaser defence is placed on the defendant,226
the burden of proving bad faith in claims to recover speciﬁc property
received from an executor was clearly placed on the claimant.227
Probably the most revealing aspect of the case law concerning deliberate
misapplications of property, as opposed to non-induced mistakes, is that
these cases provide the early foundations of the knowing receipt action.
As Harpum stated, “[m]any of the principles of liability for knowing receipt
were developed in relation to improper dispositions by executors”.228 This
would have been an unnecessary development if the strict liability personal
claim was available against these recipients.229 For example, it was stated in
Keane v Robarts that “[e]very person who acquires personal assets by a
breach of trust, or devastavit in the executor, is responsible to those who
are entitled under the will, if he is a party to the breach of trust”.230
Another example is Rolfe v Gregory where the executor used testamentary
property to pay a debt in circumstances where the recipient was aware of
the misapplication of the property.231 There was no consideration in
220 Under this analysis, these claimants enjoyed primary rights against the recipients as constructive
trustees.
221 See text to note 199 above.
222 Consett v Bell (1842) 1 Y. & C. Ch. 569.
223 Ibid., at pp. 578–79, per Sir Knight Bruce.
224 E.g. Hill (1802) 7 Ves. Jr. 152, 166, per Grant M.R.; Farr v Newman (1792) 4 Term. Rep. 621, 630, per
Grose J.
225 See Grey v I.R.C. [1960] A.C. 1 (HL), 13, per Viscount Simonds, for the meaning of “disposition”.
226 Papadimitriou v Crédit Agricole Corpn and Investment Bank [2015] UKPC 13; [2015] 1 W.L.R. 4265,
at [33], per Lord Sumption.
227 Corser v Cartwright (1874–75) L.R. 7 H.L. 731 (HL), 738, per Cairns L.C.; Richardson v Horton
(1843) 7 Beav. 112, 125, per Langdale M.R.
228 Harpum, “The Stranger”, p. 273.
229 See C. Harpum, “The Basis of Equitable Liability” in P. Birks (ed.), The Frontiers of Liability (Oxford
1994), 24.
230 Keane v Robarts (1819) 4 Madd. 332, 357, per Leach V.C.
231 Rolfe v Gregory (1865) 4 De. G. J. & S. 576 (Ch), 579, per Lord Westbury. Also Scott v Tyler (1788)
Dick. 712, 724–25, per Lord Thurlow.
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these cases whether the recipient should have been strictly liable. The only
logical conclusion is that, as with the general pattern of the equitable
regime, the proprietary claim precludes the application of any strict liability
personal claim.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The aim of the equitable regime is to assist in the recovery of misapplied
property where the trustee has breached their duty of preservation, and
this aim underpins the proprietary and personal claims in equity. If the
courts are going to impose strict liability personal claims on innocent reci-
pients under the principle of unjust enrichment, there needs to be compel-
ling reasons for doing so. But it has been demonstrated that the reasons for
this development are unconvincing. First, by focusing on the abstract
wealth of the recipient, it has been demonstrated that the unjust enrichment
approach does not support the aim of recovering misapplied property.
Second, there is no clear justiﬁcation for the introduction of unjust enrich-
ment alongside the equitable regime. It has not been possible to ﬁnd an
“unjust factor” which does not create conﬂict with well settled rules in
equity. Neither does unjust enrichment resolve the diﬃculties of establish-
ing the requisite fault element, as it merely recreates them at the defences
stage. Moreover, any injustice created by the continuing enrichment of
an innocent recipient is resolved through the personal liability of the trustee
for the breach of their duty. Third, a claim for abstract wealth will only add
an unnecessary burden for recipients. A suggested solution to the added
risks created by the unjust enrichment analysis would be to provide an add-
itional defence of change of position for the proprietary claim. But this
would only serve to weaken the equitable regime by reducing the potency
of the proprietary claim as a means of recovering misapplied property.
Fourth, the recovery of testamentary property further illustrates that claims
for the recovery of abstract wealth cannot operate alongside claims for the
recovery of speciﬁc property.
The two measures, recovery of speciﬁc property and restitution of
abstract wealth, reﬂect the fundamental distinction between cases where
the claimant enjoys rights to recover identiﬁable property transferred in
breach of a duty of preservation, and those where the claimant lacks any
such rights. There is little to be gained by harmonising the equitable regime
with the approach in unjust enrichment and much to be lost in the context of
claims for the recovery of trust property. For the sake of coherence, and to
protect the aims of the equitable regime, the unjust enrichment analysis
must be excluded in claims for the receipt of trust property.
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